


















In this paper we analyse determinants of marital dissolution. The focus is on the 
alleged influence from public transfers, including governmental transfers directed 
towards divorced families, child allowance, and child support awards. We use a 
Norwegian panel of 2.800 couples who were married in 1989, together with a broad range of 
socio-economic variables, including (expected) public and private transfers in case of 
divorce. The sample is observed over a six-year period, with the purpose of registering 
marital dissolution. 
Our findings are consistent with matching models where divorce is explained 
according to assortative mating hypothesis. We find that the level of transfers has a 
significantly positive effect on the divorce probability, and that the distribution of transfers in 
favour of the wife increases the same probability. The fact that internal re-distribution 
between spouses affects the divorce propensity is consistent with non-unitary family models, 
but at odds with the predictions from unitary and/or common wealth models. 
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1. Introduction  
The divorce rate in Norway, as in most Western countries, has increased sharply since the 
sixties, leaving Norway with one of the highest divorce rates in Europe. As a response to 
these increases, a growing body of research has attempted to identify its determinants. 
Demographic changes have been suggested, for example increasing rates of female 
education and labour market participation. If both males and females invest in human 
capital and work in the labour market,
1 the gains from specialisation inside the marriage 
decrease and, hence, the value of marriage will decrease. When gains from marriage 
become smaller, an increase in marital instability is to be expected. Another explanation 
for the increasing divorce rate is the decreasing marital fertility rates. Children can be 
seen as specific marital capital within the family, i.e.; its value is higher inside than 
outside the marriage. When the number of children declines, the value of marriage 
declines, inducing marital instability.  
In this paper we explore whether governmental programs towards divorced 
families induce marital instability. Of course, this is not necessarily an unintended effect. 
If the market fails to provide insurance against collapsed marriages, it might be optimal 
to use public transfers to prevent that the marginal offers of staying married exceed the 
marginal gains from getting a divorce.  
Transfers to divorced families might influence the divorce decision trough the 
amount of transfers to the divorced family as a whole, and through the distribution 
between the (ex-)spouses. In Norway, as in many other countries, the public transfer is 
                                                           
1 There is a substantial literature on how divorce in turn affects the (female) labour supply (see, e.g., 
Johnson and Skinner (1986, 1988), Haurin (1989), and Tanda (1994)). 
  1aimed at divorced families with dependent children under the age of 18. Basically, the 
amount depends on income, the number of children, and the labour market status of the 
custodial parent. The distribution depends on child support from the non-custodial to the 
custodial parent, which—contrary to most other countries—is efficiently enforced in 
Norway.  In most divorced families the redistribution goes from the father’s to the 
mother’s household.  
Standard models predict that an increase in expected transfers will increase the 
probability of divorce, since an increase in such transfers reduces the financial costs of 
divorce for the divorced family as a whole. As for redistribution in expected transfers 
between spouses, the predicted effect on divorce differs according to theoretical model. 
According to unitary family models, where family decisions are modelled as though 
spouses were maximizing a common unique utility, relative endowment between spouses 
does not matter for the divorce decision.
2 In non-unitary models, on the other hand, a 
relative endowment may affect the divorce decision, leaving the effect on divorce rate 
ambiguous.
3 Our ambition is to test these conflicting predictions in our econometric 
analysis. 
In addition to altering the costs of divorce, there might be other, slightly more 
subtle manners through which the welfare system might influence marital stability. There 
are multiple economic reasons for marriage; the division of labour and rearing and 
                                                                                                                                                                             
 
2 Unitary family decision model also predict pooling of income between spouses. Using a natural 
experiment in UK (a policy change that transferred child allowance from husband to wife) Lundberg et al 
(1997) reject the pooling hypothesis.  
3 Also the empirical results are ambiguous; Hoffman and Duncan (1995) find that marital instability was 
positively correlated to the amount of AFDC benefits received. Nixon (1997), on the other hand, reports 
negative effect of enforced child support. 
 
  2sharing of children are already mentioned. Weiss (1997) adds, i.e., extended credit and 
coordination of investment activities (one works while the other one goes to school), and 
pooling of non-marketable risk (one works while the other one is sick). Even if the 
institution of marriage historically has fulfilled these functions, they may be substituted 
by the market and/or by the welfare system. Maternal leave and public child support 
makes it easier for a woman to bear and rise children, sickness and unemployment 
insurance reduce the value of risk pooling, etc. In general, therefore, the development of 
social insurance reduces the needs for insurance through marriage, thereby reducing the 
gains from marriage and, hence, increases the divorce propensity.
4  
 Empirical studies to test whether governmental transfer system towards divorced 
families affect divorce decisions are relative scarce.
5 Hoffman and Duncan (1995) and 
Moffitt (1990) find evidence that an increase in public transfer to custodial parent tends 
to increase the propensity to divorce. Nixon (1997) reports that stronger child support 
enforcement policy, measured by U.S. cross-state variation in enforcement climate, 
reduces divorce rates.
  
                                                                                                                                                                            
Even though the divorce decision involves both spouses, most studies we are 
aware of model the divorce probability for only one of them (most often the wife), with 
more or less incomplete information on the partner
6. Our analysis is based on a random 
 
 
4 There might be a counter-effect, however. If the welfare state reduces the number of marriages, the 
stability of the couples that still marry, in spite of reduced financial incentives, is probably increased.  
5 These are all based on U.S. data. European contributions are remarkably scarce. There is a related 
literature on the drop in (female) income caused by marital splits (e.g., Jarvis and Jenkins, 1999); but this 
research tends to treat the divorce as an exogenous event, instead of modelling its determinants.  
6 Knowing which of the partner initiated the divorce would certainly ease the modelling process. Such 
information is, however, not available in (public) register data. Even in surveys that kind of information 
will, for obvious reasons, be highly unreliable. 
  3sample of approximately 2 900 couples that were married by the 1
st of January 1989
7. 
These are observed through 1994 with the purpose of registering changes in marital 
status. The data set includes common background information, like number and age of 
children, etc., as well as a broad range of individual data, such as income, labour market 
attachment, education, etc. This allows for a thorough analysis of differences between 
spouses as causes for marital splits. The custodial rights determine the money transfers to 
and within divorced families. For divorced couples, we observe whom of the spouses 
receive custody, and use this information to estimate the custody probability. The values 
are then imputed for the entire sample. We then calculate expected transfers for couples 
that remain married, to explore the effects of the level as well as the distribution of 
transfers on marital instability. 
Before moving to the empirical analysis, some inherent causality problems should 
be mentioned. Couples facing higher probability of divorce will invest less in marriage, 
for example give birth to fewer children and invest less in specialisation, and hence 
typically women will participate more and men less in the labour market, in both cases as 
a self-insurance in case of divorce. Furthermore, increased divorce probabilities will 
increase the demand for improved social insurance, including insurance for marital 
dissolution. The potential endogeneity problems in econometric models are obvious. One 
should also be aware of the possibility of self-reinforcement: Increasing divorce rates 
expand the remarriage market, which increases the probability of remarriage and thus 
                                                           





  4makes divorce less costly. Ideally, this calls for a dynamic econometric framework, but 
this is prevented by data limitations.  
The paper is organised as follows. In the next section we give a brief description 
of the public and private transfers involved for divorced families. Section 3 reviews some 
of the previous research on how public transfer to divorced families and child support 
policies affect the divorce decision. Data and model specification are presented in 
Section 4, while Section 5 reports the results from the estimations. Finally, Section 6 
offers some concluding remarks. 
 
2. Transfers to divorced families in Norway 
In Norway, the divorce-related transfers are aimed at families with dependent children 
(under the age of 18). An important motivation behind the transfer program, dating back 
to 1946, is to help the spouses achieve economic independence. The transfers were 
originally intended for mothers, and some parts of it survived until 1983. As of 1983 the 
program is neutral with respect to gender.  However, in practice the majority of the 
receivers are mothers.  
The public transfers set the level of the support for divorced families. The level 
depends on number and age of the children, on the labour market attachment, and on the 
spouses’ income. Important elements in the public transfers are extra public child 
support, reduced tax rates, and benefits to unemployed or educating lone breadwinners. 
On average, this part of the transfers is about 10 per cent of the pre-divorce disposable 
family income. As noted in the introduction, the alleged marital instability stems from 
  5these transfers, since they unambiguously reduce the costs of divorce for all family 
members. 
The  distribution between the parents depends entirely on the custodial 
arrangements. The parent with child custody receives all the public transfers. In addition 
he/she receives the general support to families with dependent children and, finally, child 
support from the non-custodial parent. In Norway, transfers from the non-custodial to the 
custodial parent are enforced by law. If the non-custodial fails to pay, the government 
will transfer the money to the custodial part, and take responsibility for collecting the 
debt. To our knowledge, this makes the Norwegian child support system quite unique. 
The amount of child support is in principle subject to negotiations between the divorcees 
with a standard rate as the default outcome. However, the standard rate is practised in 90 
per cent of the cases
8 and is 11 per cent of gross income for one child, 18 per cent for two 
children, and a further declining rate up to a maximum of 27 per cent of the non-
custodian’s income.  
The custodial arrangements are crucial in our context, since they influence on the 
spouses’ use of own resources to the children, the rights to receive public transfers, 
enforced child support etc. In addition, children can be considered as “assets” in their 
own respect. The Norwegian law on child custody settles one of the parents as custodian 
and the other as non-custodian. Joint custody is ruled out as an outcome from a juridical 
conflict, and therefore it is only observed if parents agree upon it. The law is neutral 
towards the custodian’s gender. Choice of custodian is guided according to what is in the 
best interest of the children. Clearly, in most divorces it is hard for a third party to 
                                                           
8 Ministry of Child and Family (1996, page 11).   
  6identify and verify whom of the parents will be the better custodian for their children. 
Hence, the law further takes into account observables such as earnings capacity, and 
whom of the parents spend more time at home.  
The next section reviews previous research on how public transfers to divorced 
families and child support policies affect the divorce decision.   
 
3.  Previous research on marriage, divorce and the welfare policy 
Following Chiappori (1992), family decisions models can be divided into two broad 
categories; (i) unitary models where a unique function is maximized under common 
budget constraints, and (ii) collective models including cooperative as well as non-
cooperative models. Among unitary models we find Samuelson’s (1956) consensus 
model, Becker’s (1974,1991) altruist model, and Becker et al (1977) common wealth 
model for marriage and divorce. In unitary models the family behaves as if it is 
maximizing one utility function subject to a joint budget constraint. Clearly, the internal 
distribution of endowments does not affect family decisions in any meaningful way in 
such models. Collective models, on the other hand, open for the possibility that the 
relative distribution between spouses matters for family decisions.
9 
The typical analysis of marriage and divorce is based on the principle of 
maximisation of expected common wealth. The seminal papers within this framework are 
                                                                                                                                                                             
 
 
9 Collective models for intact families include Nash bargaining models introduced by Manser and Brown 
(1989) and McElroy and Horney (1981), where the threat point is determined by the utilities in case of 
divorce. In these models divorce policies may influence the decision inside the families, but as long as the 
threat point is strictly inside the efficient set, the model will not result in divorce. In Lundberg and Pollak 
(1993) the threat point is the non-co-operative Nash solution. Another type of collective models for intact 
families is the Pareto efficient models as developed by Apps and Rees (1988) and Chiappori (1988, 1992). 
  7Becker (1974) and Becker et al (1979). Marriage is seen as a partnership of joint 
production and consumption in the purpose of maximisation financial wealth as well as 
non-market wealth, such as children and companionship. Individuals search for partners 
with attributes contributing to the maximisation of their common wealth. The equilibrium 
sorting will have a tendency towards positive assortative mating with respect to personal 
characteristics that are complements in production and consumption (such as education, 
age, property incomes), and negative assortative mating for characteristics that are 
substitutes (such as wage earning capacities). When a partnership forms, the couple is 
uncertain both in regards to the quality of the match and the personal characteristics such 
as future wage capacities. As time passes and uncertainty resolves, the spouses re-
evaluate their original decision and decide to continue the marriage if the expected 
common wealth is maximised by doing so. Personal characteristics and external factors 
affect the divorce decision in two ways. First, conditional on realisation of the quality of 
the match, unexpected changes in personal characteristics and/or external factors may 
influence the gains from remaining married, and hence influence on the divorce 
decisions. Second, for a particular realisation of the quality of a match, the couples are 
more likely to divorce if the initial gains from marriage were small.  
The effect of external transfer on the divorce decisions in the common wealth 
model is two-fold. First, increase in external transfer to divorced families increases the 
divorce propensity, since this reduces the financial consequences of divorce. Second, the 
introduction of divorce transfers will induce more marginal couples to marry. Hence, the 
stock of marginal marriage increases, and we are more likely to observe higher divorce 
                                                                                                                                                                             
In these models the spouses (by assumption) reach a Pareto-efficient allocation, while the actual realisation 
  8rates. Overall, in equilibrium an increase in external transfer in case of divorce will 
increase observed divorce rates. Hoffman and Duncan (1995) find empirical evidence 
that an increase in welfare support to custodial parents has a significant positive effect on 
the divorce probability. This finding is partly supported by Mofitt (1990), who finds that 
an increase in support to custodial parents will have a positive but non-significant effect 
on divorce.  
Public policies influence on the distribution of expected divorce transfers between 
spouses mainly through child support awards, the efficiency of child support enforcement 
policies, and laws on custodial right. Given an allocation of custodial rights, both 
increasing child support award and strengthening of the enforcement efforts, will increase 
the expected child support and, hence, will strengthen the position of the custodian and 
weaken the position of the non-custodian. Given the ex ante uncertainty about custody, 
each spouse will have an expected divorce transfer including public transfers as well as 
child support. Unitary models, such as the common wealth model, predict pooling of 
expected divorce transfer.
10 However, empirical evidence seem to reject the pooling 
hypothesis of expected divorce transfer. Nixon (1998) finds evidence that stronger child 
support enforcement policy, measured by U.S. cross-state variations in enforcement 
climate, reduces divorce rates. In a similar way Argys and Peters (1999), using U.S. data, 
find that increasing efficiency in the enforcement of child support awards matters for 
                                                                                                                                                                             
depends on the spouses’ relative endowments, for example earning capacities. 
10 We think of a situation where the spouses are engaged in divorce negotiations where each spouse has 
property right to an uncertain lottery of divorce transfers. A reallocation of these uncertain divorce lotteries 
changes the compensation pattern however not the actual divorce decision. If the reallocation benefits the 
spouse with the lowest preferences of braking out of the marriage, he can use this increase in expected 
divorce transfers to compensate his spouse to stay. If the reallocation is towards the spouse with the highest 
preferences for divorce, the compensation needed for her to stay is equally less. Hence, as long as the 
  9divorce settlement; it increases the probability that support awards will be courted instead 
of voluntary. Using U.S. panel data, Hoffman and Duncan (1993) find a non-significant 
effect of changes in expected child support on divorce.
11 
12  
Clark (1999) models explicitly the divorce decision where the outcome is, by 
assumption, Pareto efficient and depends on relative endowments including allocation of 
dissolution rights and custodial rights. His model predicts that divorce laws that grossly 
favour one of the spouses – for example by excessive or insufficient compensation for 
prior economic sacrifices, increase the likelihood for divorce.  
 
4. The data and model specification 
Our analysis utilises data from the KIRUT database, which consists of information from 
various administrative registers for a 10 per cent random sample of the Norwegian 
working age population. The database contains a broad range of background information 
on marital status, number and age of children, income, education, etc. These variables are 
updated yearly, providing us with a panel covering the period 1989 to 1994. 
  We picked all couples married by the 1
st of January 1989. Since our focus is on 
transfers and divorce, we concentrate on couples in their fertile age and/or with 
                                                                                                                                                                             
Coase theorem (1960) applies, allocations of property rights will affect neither the divorce decision nor 
other parts of the divorce settlement. 
11 In related literature, Peters (1986, 1992), using U.S. cross sections data with state variations in divorce 
laws, finds support for the claim that the switch from consent to unilateral divorce law (implying that the 
right to dissolve a marriage changes from the spouse that most definitely wants to stay to the spouse that 
most definitely wants to leave) had no effect on the divorce rates. Allen (1992) criticises Peter’s 
classification of unilateral states, corrects and finds that the change in law did have a significant positive 
effect on the divorce rates. Using U.S. panel data from 1968 to 1987, Friedberg (1997) finds a significant 
positive impact on divorce rates from the change to a unilateral law. Finally, Smith (1997), using time 
series data, finds a significant short-term effect but no long-term effect on the divorce rates of a change 
from consent to unilateral law in U.K. 
  10dependent children. This is done by restricting the sample to contain only couples where 
the wife was maximum 40 years of age in 1989. In addition, we excluded individuals 
with missing background information, which left us with 2.806 couples. The sample is 
then observed through 1994, with the purpose of identifying changes in marital status. By 
1994, 276 of the couples were divorced.
13 Their year of divorce is registered, and forms 
the basis for the calculations of pre and post divorce variables. 
  The dependent variable is an indicator counting 1 if the married couple become 
divorced in the period, and 0 otherwise. The same kind of background information is 
available for both spouses. As a general remedy against endogeneity, we apply 
explanatory variables that are predetermined relative to the dependent variables. In most 
cases the values of the background variables refer to 1989. To the extent that our data 
allows the parameterisation, we include levels as well as differences for each couple in 
the divorce equation.  
 
(Table 1 about here) 
  
Table 1 reveals that at the starting year of 1989 (when all the couples were 
married) the age and education means were quite similar for married and divorced 
couples. The married couples were on average slightly older, with slightly higher level of 
education. The age-differences are slightly larger for the divorced, while the opposite is 
true for educational differences.  
                                                                                                                                                                             
12 The rejection of the expected transfer pooling hypothesis is further supported by empirical findings that 
consumption pattern in intact families dependent on spouses relative income as well as total family income, 
see Phipps and Bruton (1992), Hoddinott and Haddad (1995), Lundberg, Pollak and Wales (1997). 
13 Separated couples are counted as divorced. 
  11  SosBenefits is an indicator for whether one or both of the spouses were receiving 
means tested benefits in 1989. Even if the share is small in both states, the mean is 
notably larger for divorcees. ForeignCitiz indicates foreign citizenship for one of or both 
spouses, which is rare, but considerably more frequent among the divorced. 
  NoChildren, #Children, AgeYoungest, and NewChild measure the influence from 
children on marital disruption. The foremost is a dummy variable equal to one if the 
couple is childless; the second measures number of dependent children. Age of the 
youngest child is measured by the third, while the fourth is an indicator for whether the 
couple had any new children before divorce/during the observation period. The share of 
childless couples is notably larger for dissolved compared to intact marriages. The 
number of children and age of youngest child is not very different, while there is a 
marked higher rate of children born during the observation period for married compared 
to divorced couples.
14, 15    
  The variables LabForce
Fam and ∆LabForce measure the couples’ total labour 
market participation and degree of specialisation, respectively. For each spouse the value 
of an indicator variable LabForce ranges from 0 to 1, where 1 is full time labour market 
participation. We define LabForce
Fam = LabForce
Husb + LabForce
Wife  and                               
∆LabForce = LabForce
Husb – LabForce
Wife. The variable ∆LabForce = 1 indicates the 
highest degree of traditional specialisation (husband in the labour market and wife at 
                                                           
14 Part of this comes from our design: Except for couples divorced in 1994, married couples will have 
longer marital tenure than divorced, which increases the possibility of having new children. 
15 A possible objection against the variable NewChild  as a regressor is that the causality might be 
ambiguous. One might argue that the happily married have an increased probability of having a new child 
or, on the contrary, that the decision of having a new child might be an attempt to solve the marriage from 
disruption. In either case, the divorce expectation influences on the NewChild variable and, hence, violates 
the exogeneity assumption. In our model, not only does NewChild enter as an explanatory variable in its 
  12home) within the family. Note the distinct difference between the marital states, with a 
considerably higher degree of male labour market specialisation for married than for 
divorced. Note also that the variables are predetermined, since they measure the 
participation in 1989, i.e. before divorce.  
The income variables are based on the spouses’ incomes in 1988.
16 Table 1 shows 
that the family income for married couples on average is slightly higher than the 
dissolved families’ pre-divorce income. ∆Income is considerably higher for married 
couples; specialisation in the families once again appears as a natural explanation. 
As explained in Section 3, the transfers critically depend on the custodial 
arrangement. In all empirical analyses that we are aware of, the researchers assume—
explicitly or implicitly—that the mother becomes the custodian. This is also the case with 
most divorces in Norway. Still, in a significant numbers of cases (some 15 per cent in our 
sample) the father ends up as the custodian. We therefore estimate the probability of 
getting custody in a separate regression (see Appendix). For each spouse S  (S = 
Husb(and), Wife) we calculate transfers in case of custody and non-custody according to 





17 Expected transfer for spouse S 
then becomes: 
 
                                                                                                                                                                             
own, in addition, it influences the value of the transfers variables (see description below). The standard 
procedures for specification are therefore no longer valid. 
 
16 We do have access to more recent income information (1989-1994). A major concern is, however, that 
the income variables are as predetermined as possible. In the trade-off between precision and 
predeterminedness, we give priority to the latter. All incomes and transfers are deflated by the Norwegian 
Consumer Price Index, with 1995 as base year. 
17 Note that we use the actual rules in force, and that the calculated amounts not necessarily equals the 
realisations. Details are available from the authors upon request. 
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where   is wife i’s estimated probability of getting custody. In the econometric model 
we include total expected transfers, Trans , as well as 
difference in expected transfers,  ; the latter reflecting 
redistribution of expected transfers between spouses.  
p ˆ
Wife Husb Fam Trans Trans + =
Wife Husb Trans Trans − = Trans ∆
An important point in our analysis is that the custodial rights determine the 
distribution of transfers between the spouses, and that this fact should be reflected when 
we model the spouses’ behaviour. This is why we suggest a separate equation for the 
probability of receiving custody, rather than simply to assume that the mother becomes 
custodial. The use of an estimated  probability of child custody as an element in 
calculating the transfer variables is not trivial, however: 
 Define  C as maternal custody, given divorce, D. Let the conditional probability of 
which, p, be determined by a vector of explanatory variables, Z, and an error term, ε ;
18 
 
ε + ′ = = = ≡ α Z Z ) 1 , | 1 ( Pr D C ob p  
 
                                                                                                                                                                             
 
 




  14  Based on the sub-sample of divorced couples, we estimate (by a probit model) the 
parameters  , and use them to impute the probability of custody,  , for the complete 
sample; divorced as well as married. In this manner we are able to calculate expected 
transfers for all individuals according to the formulas presented earlier. The divorce 
probability now becomes 
α p ˆ
 
      ν τ τ + + + ′ = = rans T rans T p D ob
Fam ˆ ∆ ˆ ) ˆ , | 1 ( Pr 2 1 β X X
 
where    and   are estimated family transfers and transfer differences, 
respectively, and   is a vector of other relevant regressors in the divorce equation. In 
some respects the approach resembles a selection model as that of Heckman (1976, 1978, 
1979). If unobserved characteristics influence on the probability of custody as well as the 
probability of divorce, i.e., 
Fam rans T ˆ rans T ˆ ∆
β X′
0 ) , cov( ≠ ν ε , then the parameter estimates of the divorce 
equation become inconsistent, since cov( 0 ) , ≠ p ν . It is not hard to think of cases where 
this might be the case. If, for example, the husband becomes a notorious drunkard, his 
divorce probability and the probability that his wife will end up with the child custody 
increase simultaneously. If the wife is the one with problems of this kind, the divorce 
probability presumably increases correspondingly, while she now becomes the part with 
reduced probability of receiving custody. In any case, this constitutes an endogeneity 
problem caused by unobserved heterogeneity.
19  
                                                           
19 The fact that the correlation between the two possibilities can be positive as well as negative does not 
remove the endogenity problem. It simply implies that the direction of the bias is unknown, a priori. 
  15In standard selection models this is remedied by the calculation of a generalised 
residual which, when entered into the outcome equation, in principle corrects for the 
simultaneity bias. The situation is somewhat more complicated in our case, since the 
estimated probability enters the outcome equation also as weights in the calculation of 
the transfers variables. The properties of the standard models with generalised residuals 
will therefore not apply in our case.  
  Note, however, that it is the estimated and, hence, instrumented probability of 
custody that enters the divorce equation.
20 Moreover, the transfers variables are only 
partly determined by the custody probabilities; the other component is the public 
regulations in force, which has been applied individually to the whole sample. The fact 
that the transfers included are calculated according to predetermined rules, and not 
observed, is also presumed to contribute to their exogeneity. 
    Table 1 reveals that divorced families on average receive the same amount in 
transfers as the comparable (expected) amount for intact families. As expected, the wives 
are net receivers of transfers, which is illustrated with the negative figures of ∆  in 
Table 1. Divorced men on average expect to transfer NOK 87.610 to their ex-wives, 




The probit estimates of determinants for marital dissolution, converted to marginal 
effects, are reported in Table 2.  
                                                           
20 The parameterisation, and hence the functional form, is different in the two equations, and constitutes 
our identifying restrictions. 
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  (Table 2 about here) 
 
Starting with the average age of the spouses, we find that the probability of a 
marital split is reduced by 0.8 per cent  for each married year. This result is probably a 
mix of several effects. It can be explained by a generational effect, since we know that 
the younger cohorts on average have a more liberal view of divorce than the older ones. 
Furthermore, if we, lacking information on the year of marriage, assume a positive 
correlation between age and number of marriage years, the negative effect on divorce 
probability might be explained by the facts that (i) low marriage age increases the 
probability of divorce, and (ii) the fact that unstable marriages dissolve first, leaving the 
remaining marriages with a reduced probability of divorce.  
The age difference between spouses appears to contribute positively to marital 
dissolution. This finding is consistent with the interpretation that great age difference is 
associated with low initial gains from marriage and, hence, gives support to the (positive) 
assortative mating hypothesis. 
Working with a reduced form model we have no manifest a priory suggestions to 
the sign of the education variables. To the degree that educational level, as a proxy for 
human capital for the family, is positively correlated with the probability of becoming re-
married for both spouses, we expect to find a negative parameter. The sign is as expected, 
but the coefficient is not significantly different from zero. The interpretation of the effect 
from the variable measuring the educational difference between the spouses (∆Educat) is 
less straightforward. If the level of education signals social and/or cultural orientation, 
  17one might assume positive assortative mating taking place and, hence, that large 
differences contribute negatively to the stability of the marriage. Education as investment 
in human capital is an example of a characteristic that contributes to the wage earnings 
capacity. As such, we expect negative assortative mating to take place, with positive 
coefficient as a consequence. Finally, applying the re-marriage argument, the spouse with 
the higher education is expected to have increased divorce probability. On the other hand, 
the less educated spouse has increased incentives to keep the marriage unbroken. Not 
surprisingly, with such a list of possible effects working in opposite directions, the 
educational difference-parameter turns out to be insignificantly different from zero. 
  As expected, couples where one or both of the spouses receive social benefits 
have increased probability of becoming divorced. Continuing down the table we find that 
foreign citizenship (ForeignCitiz) has a positive effect on the estimated probability. 
Hence, the probability of divorce is higher for these categories. 
All four parameters related to children are significant—the coefficient for the 
NoChildren-dummy only at the 10 per cent level, though—and have the expected sign. 
Couples without children have increased probability of divorce. Marital stability 
increases with the number of children, but decreases as the children get older. Couples 
that got one or several children in the period from 1989 to 1994 have a marked less 
probability of becoming divorced. 
  The spouses aggregate labour market participation, LabForce
Fam, relates to the 
frequently advocated hypothesis that marriage is more fragile in families exposed to the 
“time-trap”, with both parents participating in the labour force and, hence, that have little 
time left for family matters. We find no support for this hypothesis, in that the coefficient 
  18is insignificantly different from zero. However, the significantly negative coefficient for 
the ∆LabForce variable once again appears to confirm the (negative) assortative mating 
hypothesis. Hence, the traditional specialisation—with the husband working in the labour 
market and the wife at home—adds to the stability of the marriage. 
 The  coefficient  for  Income
Fam is very far from being significant, indicating that a 
proportionate
21 increase in both spouses’ income has no sizeable effect on the probability 
of divorce. The negatively estimated coefficient attached to the ∆Income variable implies 
that redistribution in favour of the husband has a negative impact on the divorce 
probability. Of course, by way of parameterisation, this implies that redistribution in 
favour of the wife increases the divorce probability.
22 Predictions on the income 
differences can be derived from the assortative mating hypothesis. If the husband has 
high relative earnings, this indicates a high degree of specialisation. High specialisation 
tends to stabilise the marriage, since it gives the opportunity of realising gains from 
coordination of work at home and in the labour market. This gives support to a negative 
(i.e. stabilising) effect from ∆Income, which represents the “traditional” families with the 
husband being the main earner.    
  Finally, we turn to the main object of this study, namely the effects from external 
transfers. A priori we believe the expected transfers to the family, Trans
Fam, to have a 
positive effect on the probability of divorce since, firstly, increased transfers to both 
                                                           
21 Since we control for variation in the income differences between couples, variation in the family income 
can only come about by changing both spouse’s income in the same direction and by the same amount. 
Hence, the estimated coefficient represents level variation conditional on income differences being 
unaltered. 
22 Arguing along the same lines as for the Income
Fam variable, ∆Income is a pure distributional measure. To 
see why, note that the (partial) effect of a marginal change in ∆Income measures the impact of a change in 
the income difference, all other covariates—including family income—being constant. With constant 
  19spouses unambiguously reduces the costs of dissolution. Secondly, increased level of 
transfers presumably increases the stock of marginal marriages at first hand, which in 
turn leads to higher divorce rates. This is supported by our findings, in that we find the 
coefficient to be positive, and clearly significant.
23 As was the case for the income 
variables, a change in ∆Trans
 represents a pure redistribution of expected transfer in 
favour of the husband. We estimate the impact to be negative and highly significant. 
The results regarding expected transfers differences call for several remarks. First, 
the fact that redistribution does matter supports the collective model approach of family 
modelling. As discussed in Section 3, internal (re-)distribution between spouses does not 
affect the divorce decision if we base our predictions on unitary models. In this respect, 
our findings are at odds with the altruist and common wealth models of Becker (1974, 
1981) and Becker et al. (1977). Collective models, on the other hand, open for this 
possibility (Chiappori, 1988, 1992, Chiappori and Weiss  (2000)).   
Second, a redistribution of the expected transfer in favour of the husband has a 
negative and hence stabilising effect on marriage. Or—conversely—a redistribution in 
favour of the wife increases the divorce probability. A possible explanation can be found 
in the sociological literature (see e.g. Zeiss et al (1980) and Moxnes (1990)) where a 
common finding is that the wife most often takes the initiative to divorce and, 
accordingly, the part that usually determines whether the marriage shall remain 
                                                                                                                                                                             
family income a change in the income difference is only possible with a complete redistribution between 
the couples. 
 
23 This result partly gives support to Hoffman and Duncan (1995), who find a small and significantly 
positive effect on the probability of divorce, and to Moffitt (1990), who reports at a positive effect, albeit 
insignificant at the 5 per cent level. 
 
 
  20unbroken. This might shed some light on our findings: The higher the expected transfers 
difference is in favour of the husband, the higher is the husband’s incentive to break up, 
as is the wife’s incentive to stay married. Equivalently, redistribution in favour of the 
wife increases the wife’s incentives and reduces the husband’s incentives to divorce. It 
then becomes an empirical question whom of the spouses actually gets his or her way. 
Our results are consistent with the hypothesis that the wife on average decides whether 
the marriage shall remain intact.   
 
6. Summary and concluding remarks 
In this paper, we have estimated determinants to martial dissolution. The focus has been 
the influence from variation in public transfers, controlling for a number of socio-
economic and demographic variables. Increasing average age of the spouses was found to 
add to the stability of the marriage, while age difference in favour of the husband had the 
opposite effect. The degree of specialisation, in that the traditional family structure with 
the husband specialising in the labour market and the wife in the home production has a 
stabilising effect on the marriages in our sample. As for the age and the labour force 
participation variables, they lend support to the assortative mating hypothesis. The effects 
of the income variables may to some degree be interpreted in a similar way. High 
earnings capacity for the husbands signals high labour market productivity and, hence, 
high degree of specialisation. High degree of specialisation tends to stabilise the 
marriage, since it gives the couple the opportunity of realising the gains in the labour 
market and in the home production. There is no sizeable effect of our education variables 
on marital (in)stability. 
  21Our results indicate that the level of transfers has the expected positive effect on 
the estimated probability of divorce. Hence, public transfers to divorced families appear 
to destabilise marriages. As pointed out in the introduction, this might be optimal as long 
as the markets fails to provide insurance against divorce, but it is hard—and definitely 
beyond the scope of the present paper—to argue whether the present divorce rates are too 
high or too low. 
Re-distribution of the transfers in favour of the husband and in disfavour of the 
wife significantly reduces the divorce probability. This we interpret as being in 
accordance with collective models for family dissolution, but at odds with unitary and 
common wealth models. Our findings that redistribution in favour of the husband 
stabilises the marriage, while redistribution in favour of the wife has the opposite effect, 
is consistent with the findings from several survey analysis: that the wife in most cases is 
the part which determines whether the marriage will remain intact. 
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  25APPENDIX 
 
Table A1. Determinants for child custody. Probit estimates, marginal effects (%) 
 
Dependent variable: The mother’s probability of receiving child custody. 
 
      C o e f f      S t d   e r r  
 
#Children               0.07    2.87 
AgeYoungest        -1.48**  0.55 
Age
Husb            0.27   0.56   
Age
Wife               -0.23    0.70 
Breadw
Husb        11.14**  4.07 
Breadw
Wife          0.45   5.23 
Income
Husb          0.06**  0.03 
Income
Wife        -0.02     0.04 
 
N:       206 
Pseudo R
2:
      0.155 
Observed  probability:     0.88 
Predicted  probability:     0.92 
 
Notes to the table: 
•  ** indicates significance at least at the 5 per cent  level. 
•  All variables are observed at the year of divorce. 
•  #Children and AgeYoungest measure number of children and age of youngest child, resp. 
•  Age
S is age of spouse S, S = (Husb(and), Wife) 
•  Breadw
S is a dummy variable indicating whom of the spouses is main breadwinner (1 if he/she works 
more than the other; 0 otherwise). 
•  Income
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        MARRIED (N=2670)      DIVORCED (N=276)   
 




Fam  (years)          34.17             32.57 
∆ Age (years)         2.92            3.37  
 
Educat
Fam (years)      11.59            11.16 
∆ Educat (years)      0.49             0.23  
 
SosBenefits           0.02            0.09 
 
ForeignCitiz        0.05               0.11 
  
NoChildren       0.11            0.18 
#Children            1.84              1.53 
AgeYoungest          5.55              5.11 
NewChild (after 1989)    0.29               0.12 
 
LabForce
Fam           1.15               1.09 
∆ LabForce            0.33               0.12 
 
Income
Fam (1000 NOK)   218.56        202.70   
∆ Income(1000 NOK)         72.52          50.16  
 
Trans
Fam (1000 NOK)        38.94          38.82 
∆ Trans (1000 NOK)     -105.32        -87.61 
 
 
Notes to the table: 
To the extent that the data allows for parameterisation, the table refers to family levels and differences, 
respectively. For example, the value 34.17 for Age
Fam  in category Married refers to the total mean of 
spouse averages, while the value 2.9 for ∆Age in the same category means that average difference is 2.9 
years in favour of the husband.  
 
  27Table 2. Determinants of marital dissolution. Probit estimates. 
 
 
Dependent variable:  
Probability of being divorced in 1994, conditional on being married in 1989. 
 
                   Average     Marg.effect (%)    
               
Age
Fam           34.08     -0.78*** 
∆ Age
                2.90       0.41** 
 
Educat
Fam       11.55     -0.33    
∆ Educat
          0.47       0.04 
 
SosBenefits  (1989)           0.02   13.49*** 
 
ForeignCitiz         0.02       9.66** 
 
N o C h i l d r e n          0.11      2.72 
#Children (1989)        1.81     -4.25*** 
AgeYoungest  (1989)        5.60       0.57*** 
NewChild (after  1989)      0.28   -12.28*** 
 
LabForce
Fam          1.15         4.32 
∆ LabForce
         3.44         0.98*** 
 
Income
Fam (NOK 10 000)        21.88      -0.00   
∆ Income
 (NOK 10 000)         7.08                -0.27***    
 
Trans
Fam (NOK 10 000)         3.84       0.87***       
∆ Trans
 (NOK 10 000)                -10.32      -0.39***   
 
N  :         2  806 
Observed probability:       0.092 
Predicted probability:       0.064 
Pseudo R
2:         0.137 
 
 
Notes to the table: 
** and *** indicate significance at least at the 5 and 1 percent level, respectively.
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